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MEDICAL EVIDENCE
ADRIAN P. SCHOONE* AND TERENCE T. EvANs**
INTRODUCTION-STATEMENT OF TIE PROBLEM
Wisconsin trial attorneys have been receiving with increasing fre-
quency the following type of physician's opinion:
It is my opinion this patient has developed a low back syn-
drome which is now a chronic lumbosacral strain. I do not be-
lieve he has a herniated disc. I believe he will continue to have
his subjective complaints of low back tenderness, although he
has no neurological changes whatever. I believe that his com-
plaints of pain, continuing for the year and one-half I have
treated him, will be permanent and that he has sustained a cer-
tain amount of permanent disability.
Medical opinions of permanent disability or of a reduced ability to
engage in gainful activity' are being rendered solely on the basis of the
subjective complaints of the patient-without any objective signs of
injury or disability.' One of the more common instances is in the case
of the claimed low back strain, perhaps initially accompanied by con-
tusions and spasms which will have disappeared entirely by the time
of trial.3 Notwithstanding the absence of any basis in signs perceptible
to him, the physician may wish to advance the opinion that the low
back discomfort, claimed to have persisted since the trauma, is now a
static and permanent condition .Such an opinion is sometimes followed
by an expression of disability in terms of percentages, as in Work-
men's Compensation cases where the schedule in the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act4 is then employed.
Some physicians have taken the position that, while there may be
no objective manifestation of the cause of their patients' continuing
complaints, they have no reason to disbelieve them. Hence, they opine
that the condition of pain will be permanent. In short, the medical
profession appears to have abandoned the entity of malingering and
abdicated it to the legal profession.5
*Editor-in-Chief, Marquette Law Review, 1958-59; Practicing Attorney, La
France, Thompson, Greenquist, Evans & Dye, Racine, Wisconsin.
**B. A., Marquette University (1963) ; candidate for J.D. degree, Marquette
University (1967).
1 This is a standard suggested by the American Medical Association Committee
on Medical Rating of Physical Impairment. See 177 A.M.A.J. 489 (August 19,
1961).
2 For a discussion of the distinction between subjective and objective symptoms,
see 50 MARQ. L. REv. 158, 159-60 n. 6 (1966), analyzing Rivera v. Wollin, 30
Wis.2d 305, 140 N.W.2d 748 (1966), discussed infra at p. 521.
3 See the description and hypothetical colloquy in 2 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcrs
Back Injuries 308-14 (1959). The narration which there appears is taking on
a familiar ring in Wisconsin personal injury trials.
4 WIS. STAT. §102.52 (1965).
5 Houts, Malingering: The Lawyer's Exchsive Problem, 8 Trauma No. 4, p. 2(Dec. 1966).
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But does the law permit a medical expert to express an opinion of
permanent disability predicated solely on the subjective complaints of
the patient? (Trial lawyers have long recognized that the recital of
personal symptoms by the plaintiff are sometimes quite unreliable.6 )
The purpose of this article is to examine relevant Wisconsin Supreme
Court decisions which indicate an equivocal answer to date, and to
consider foreign authorities which have examined the question.
"EXPERT PROOF MUST SUPPORT AN AWARD FOR FUTURE PAIN"-
FRom DIEMEL, AROUND LUCAS, TO RIvERA.
The obvious assertion that a doctor opining permanent disability
purely upon the complaints of his patient is merely lending credence
to these complaints-and not operating within his area of expertise-
was advanced in a sense in the early case of Qsuaife v. Chi. & N.W.
Ry. 7 There, a plaintiff was examined by a panel of medical experts
midway during a trial. She complained of pain in her hip, but nothing
accounting for it was detected. One of the experts related that when
he struck the bottom of her foot, she appeared to have pain in the hip
joint. On appeal, it was claimed that since that expert had found no
physical condition indicating the existence of pain, his answer could
only be an opinion of the veracity of the plaintiff, presumably not a
medical issue. The supreme court disagreed:
. .. The experts examine the limb and hip, and find no such
appearance as would indicate lameness and pain. Yet, the patient
insists upon the fact of lameness and pain. It becomes then a
question with the experienced physician, whether such pains and
lameness are imaginary, feigned or real; and, to determine
this, he must resort to other evidences than those to be derived
from an examination of the limb itself. And in such case we
think it is clearly competent for the expert to give an opinion
from the general appearance, actions and looks of the patient,
and what she says at the time in regard to her condition. (Em-
phasis added)'
Regrettably, the Quaife decision contained no indication of the em-
phasis placed by the court on the reaction resulting from tapping the
plaintiff's heel. The case is not squarely germane to the issue here con-
sidered, because it dealt with the doctor's opinion as to pain sensation
rather than permanent disability. It has not since been cited in any
Wisconsin case involving that question. However, it has been repeatedly
6 E.g., GOLDSTEIN & SHABAT, MEDICAL TRIAL TECHNIQUE, p. 176 (1957):
Injuries and diseases of the back, particularly of the lower back, present
disturbing problems to both doctors and lawyers because (a) it is often dif-
ficult to distinguish legitimate claims frqm fraudulent, (b) some X-rays give
little aid in diagnosing certain types of back injuries, (c) in making a diagno-
sis it is often necessary to rely almost wholly upon the history and the some-
times unreliable recital by the patient of his subjective symptoms.
7 48 Wis. 513, 4 N.W. 658 (1880).8 Id. at 523, 4N.W. at 663.
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mentioned in cases where the physician sought to relate the history
obtained from the patient.9 The Quaife case has also been popular out-
side of Wisconsin concerning the issue of whether a physician may state
pain exists based on the complaints of his patient (which is apart from
the problem of whether that pain is permanent).1°
Significantly one treatise writer states:
The decision in Quaife v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co. (citation
omitted), perhaps goes as far as any which has been examined
in holding that, even in the absence of any such external ap-
pearance as would indicate lameness or pain, examining physi-
cians of experience may express their opinions, from the gen-
eral appearance, actions, and looks of the patient, whether the
pains complained of are imaginary, feigned, or real.'
Apart from any intimations of Qiuife, the first Wisconsin decision
actually focusing upon the precise topic under present discussion is
Diemel v. Weirich.' There, the plaintiff alone testified about the diffi-
culty she was having at time of trial as a result of the bruises and
sprains sustained in the collision. Although she was treated by two
physicians for those injuries, no expert medical testimony was offered
in her behalf. Counsel for the defendants asked the trial court to in-
struct the jury that no damages were allowable for future pain and
suffering or for permanent disability. The trial court rejected the re-
quest and instructed the jury in effect that it might award damages for
future pain and suffering, but not for permanent disability. On appeal,
the defendants relied upon Wenneman v. Royal Indemnity Co.13
There, the court held that in the absence of proof "otherwise than un-
supported subjective statements of plaintiff," there could be no award
for future pain and suffering.'
14
The court, in Wenneman, did not consider whether a physician
could express his opinions as to future pain and suffering or permanent
disability based purely on such statements by a plaintiff.
But, in the Diemel case, after making reference to the holdings in
Landrath v. Allstate Ins. Co.,15 and Karsten v. Meis,1 6 the court laid
down the following rule:
9 Of course, the hoary distinction between symptoms related for treatment and
also for trial preparation was obliterated in Ritter v. Coca-Cola Co., 24 Wis.
2d 157, 128 N.W.2d 439 (1964). Wegerer v. Koehler, 28 Wis.2d 241, 137 N.W.2d
115 (1965). And, see, in general, Arnold, Medical Evidence in Wisconsin
1956-1966, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 657, 665-669 (1966).
10 See Annots., 28 A.L.R. 362 (1924), 97 A.L.R. 1284 (1935). Both annotations
cite and discuss the Quaife case.
11 Annot., 28 A.L.R. 362 (1924).
12264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W.2d 651 (1953).
13 251 Wis. 630, 30 N.W.2d 250 (1947).
14 Id. at 634, 30 N.W.2d at 252.
15 259 Wis. 248,48 N.W.2d 485 (1951).
16263 Wis. 307, 57 N.W.2d 360 (1953).
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The general rule followed in other jurisdictions as well as
Wisconsin, is well stated in 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, p. 649, iec.
778, as follows:
'...where the injury is subjective in character and of such
nature that a layman cannot with reasonable certainty know
whether or not there will be future pain and suffering, the
courts generally require the introduction of competent expert
opinion testimony bearing upon the permanency of such injury
or the likelihood that the injured person will endure future
pain and suffering before allowing recovery therefor.'
We believe that sound public policy requires adherence to
such rule. It is a rare personal-injury case indeed in which
the injured party at time of trial does not claim to have some
residual pain from the accident. Not being a medical expert,
such witness is incompetent to express an opinion as to how
long such pain is going to continue in the future. The mem-
bers of juries also being laymen should not be permitted to
speculate how long, in their opinion, they think such pain will
continue in the future, and fix damages therefor accordingly.
Only a medical expert is qualified to express an opinion to a
medical certainty, or based on medical probabilities (not mere
possibilities), as to whether the pain will continue in the future,
and, if so, for how long a period it will so continue. In the
absence of such expert testimony (which was the situation in the
instant case) the jury should be instructed that no damages may
be allowed for future pain and suffering.'7
And so the supreme court appeared to answer affirmatively the
basic question here considered, notwithstanding the following state-
ment made by Mrs. Diemel's counsel on appeal:
Plaintiff respectfully inquires whether a plaintiff to recover
for personal injuries must call a doctor and finally under this
type circumstances what conceivable value, a doctor's testimony
on future pain could be, or what greater probative force it could
have than plaintiff's own testimony of persistent continuing pain.
We urge the negative otherwise the medical profession would
unreasonably control litigant's basic rights. 8
The suggestion that a doctor's opinion of future difficulty, predi-
cated solely on subjective complaints of the patient, would be no more
reliable than the patient's opinion has never since been expressly ac-
knowledged by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. But, within a month
after Diemel, the court took great care to emphasize the presence of
objective signs of injury as the basis of an award for permanent injury
in Rasmussen v. Metropolitan Casualty Co. 9 No reference to the
Diemel case was made in the later case.
However, Diemel has been followed in many cases since it was
decided. In the first such case, Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety
'7264 Wis. 265, 268-69, 58 N.W.2d 651, 652-53 (1953).
is Brief of Respondent, p. 29, Diemel v. Weirich, id.
19 264 Wis. 432, 59 N.W.2d 457 (1953).
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Co.,20 the supreme court emphasized medical testimony that the reality
of claimed pain couldn't be determined, and ordered a new trial because
of excessive damages.
An aggravated instance in which the court gave at least tacit ap-
proval to an opinion of permanent suffering based entirely upon sub-
jective complaints is Crye v. Mueller." There, the quoted dialogue be-
tween attorney and physician provides an insight into the nebulous
nature of such an opinion. A like case is Powers v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2"
where the orthopedic specialist called by the defense expressed an opin-
ion of five per cent disability of the left knee-based on the "sincerity"
of the patient in expressing her discomfort.23 However, Mr. Chief
Justice Currie did point out that there were some objective findings to
buttress the opinion, such as atrophy of the leg and a clicking noise on
flexion. The defense did not attack the substance of the medical evi-
dence on permanent disability, but, relying on Shields v. Fredrick,'2 4
questioned the competence of the experts since they had been employed
after suit had been commenced to give testimony instead of treatment.
The court's terse response was, "once opinion evidence based upon
subjective evidence gets into the record without objection it may be
considered by the jury in making their findings. ' 25
The next important case in the chronology of those using the
Diemel rule to permit opinions of permanency without basis in ob-
jective signs, is Albers v. Herman Mut. Ins. Co.,2' involving claimed
injury to the fibrous or muscular tissue of the cervical spine. A short
time later, Mr. Justice Wilkie wrote the decision in Lucas v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.,2 7 which, in the authors' judgment, placed
a stringent limitation on the Diemel rule as it had been theretofore
applied. In the Lucas case, the court stated:
In analyzing the testimony as to the existence of any per-
manency of the injury or the likelihood that the injured person
will endure future pain and suffering before recovery may be
allowed therefor, there should be competent objective medical
findings and the unsupported subjective statements of the in-
jured party are not sufficient. Diemel v. Weirich (1953), 264
Wis. 265, 58 N.W. (2d) 651. (Emphasis added.) 28
This language departs from the prior cases, in which medical opin-
ions based purely on "unsupported subjective statements" of patients
had been permitted; but the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been
205 Wis.2d 535, 93 N.W.2d 433 (1958).
217 Wis.2d 182, 193, 96 N.W.2d 520 (1959).
" 10 Wis2d 78, 102 N.W.2d 393 (1960).
2' Id. at 83, 102 N.W.2d, at 396.
24232 Wis. 595, 288 N.W. 241 (1939).
25 10 Wis.2d 78, 85-86, 102 N.W.2d 393, 397 (1960).
26 17 Wis.2d 385, 117 N.W.2d 364 (1962).
27 17 WNVis.2d 568, 117 N.W.2d 660 (1962).
28I d. at 572, 117 N.W.2d at 662.
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zealous in adhering to the requirement of "competent objective medical
findings" since Lucas. In Borowske v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co.,29 and
Erdmann v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,30 awards for permanent
injury, seemingly based only on subjective complaints related to the
physicians, were sustained.
However, in Moritz v. Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,3 the
court repeated the language quoted above with approval. Thereafter,
Wegerer v. Koehler- was reviewed, and, in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Gordon, awards for permanency based on subjective complaints were
affirmed without reference to either Diemel or Lucas. Nevertheless,
in Huss v. Vande Hey,33 complaints of pain in the back and neck were
said by the same Justice to be "types of injuries as to which the prog-
nostications of one who is not medically qualified are insufficient to
support a judgment for damages either as to permanence or as to
future pain and suffering. 34
One may query what clairvoyance is accorded a physician enabling
him to penetrate the workings of his patient's mind so as to determine
the veracity of complaints unsubstantiated by anything objective. The
supreme court had a further opportunity to answer this question in
Rivera v. Wollin.35 There, the effect of a physician's statement that a
patient would have pain for an indefinite time was considered. The
statement was predicated upon an examination made some fourteen
months before trial, which revealed a tender subcutaneous nodule. The
supreme court held this type of injury was "of such nature that a
layman cannot with reasonable certainty know whether or not there
will be future pain and suffering"-the Diemel test, despite the pres-
ence of the nodule. It then restated the Diemel rule, requiring expert
testimony for an award of permanency, to read as follows:
Where the injury cannot be objectively determined or where it
is of such nature that a layman cannot with reasonable certainty
know whether or not there will be future pain and suffering.A6
Unfortunately, in re-stating the Diemel requirement, the court
did not provide trial judges and lawyers of the state with a resolution
of the apparent conflict between Diemel and Lucas. The clash over
the quality of proof supporting a claim for permanent injury continues.
And, more and more doctors are assuming the posture of expressing
faith in the legitimacy of their patients' complaints, despite the absence
2920 Wis.2d 93, 121 N.W.2d 287 (1963).
30 20 Wis.2d 439, 122 N.W.2d 430 (1963).
3127 Wis.2d 13, 23, 133 N.W.2d 235 (1965).
3228 Wis.2d 241, 137 N.W.2d 115 (1965).
3329 Wis2d 34, 138 N.W.2d 192 (1965).34Id. at 39, 138 N.W.2d at 195.
3530 Wis.2d 305, 140 N.W.2d 748 (1966), analyzed in depth in 50 MARQ. L. REV.
158 (1966).
36 Id. at 313, 140 N.W.2d at 753.
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of any bases. When those expressions take the. form of opinions of
five to ten per cent disability of the body as a whole, arising out of
small bruises to the hip and claimed back strain for which there is a
high incidence of occurrence, defense attorneys and their clients are
faced with a problem of no small magnitude. 37
Complicating it is the absence of any distinct rule of law deducible
from other jurisdictions.
FOREIGN CASES ARE IN LIKE CONFLICT
A popular text on trial practice professes to epitomize the law on
the question:
In specific application of the foregoing it has been held,
where the existence of a disease or state of injury is undoubted,
that medical opinion may be received that the condition is one
which is accompanied by pain, which will continue as long as the
condition persists, or that the condition prevents or limits ability
to perform manual labor or pursue ordinary activities. By the
great weight of authority, under the conditions indicated, medical
opinion is also admissible as to the probable duration of a disease
or state of injury; that it is curable or will improve or that it is
permanent. (Emphasis added) 38
But, a leading treatise does not contain that emphasis:
It is to be observed at the outset that in nearly every case dis-
cussing the necessity of expert evidence to warrant submission
to the jury of the issue either as to the permanency of the injury
or as to future pain and suffering, or an award of damages on
such basis, the court's conclusion will depend upon the nature
of the injury. That is, if the injury is of an objective nature
(such as the loss of an arm, leg, or other member) the jury may
draw their conclusions as to future pain and suffering from that
fact alone (the permanency of such injury being obvious);
whereas there must be expert evidence as to future pain and
suffering or permanency where the injury is subjective in char-
acter.3 9
A case which puts the character of medical opinion as to disability
based on subjective complaints in proper focus is Horowitz v. Ham-
burg American Packet Co."° There, an instruction charging the jury
that they were at liberty to consider the "lasting or permanent char-
acter" of a back injury, notwithstanding the absence of any objective
signs or expert medical opinion, was initially approved. But, then the
37 It should be noted that Arnold, Medical Evidence in l!isconsin 1956-1966, 49
.IARQ. L. REv. 657, 679 (1966), discusses many of the decisions considered
in this article, but does not consider whether the physician should be per-
mitted to opine disability purely on subjective symptoms.
3s BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS, §438, pp. 791-92 (1949).
3 Annot., 115 A.L.R. 1149, 1150 (1938).
-0 18 Mlisc. 24,41 N.Y.S. 54 (1896).
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judgement was reversed without further opinion,4" based on the dissent
of Daly, J., who had pointedly remarked:
If a defendant's liability in damages may be allowed to rest upon
opinion, it should not be the opinion of a jury without the help
of science. If a guess is to have such serious consequences, it
should be the guess of a medical man of learning and experience.
These observations do not apply, of course, to the loss of a mem-
ber, nor, perhaps in the case of a fracture. (Emphasis added)4 2
The characterizing of an opinion based only on subjective com-
plaints as a "guess" seems accurate. The pertinent inquiry is whether
"guesses" should form the foundation for an award of damages, even
if they come from the lips of professional men. In Shuck v. Keefe,43
the Iowa Supreme Court held that the very nature of a claim for future
pain and suffering requires corroboration and proof by expert wit-
nesses. Like so many other cases, this one does not spell out what type
of corroborative proof is required.
In digesting possibly relevant decisions, the treatise authors have
been more concerned with whether the complaints were made in con-
nection with treatment or pre-trial preparation, than with whether the
opinions based solely thereon were probative." But, from reading the
several cases germane to the issue, one must conclude the law is un-
settled. In Elgin A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson,4 s it was held by the
Illinois Supreme Court that a doctor having treated a patient may ex-
press an opinion as to his condition, based on information gained from
the patient. Much earlier, the Massachusetts court ruled a surgeon
attending and prescribing for an injured person about three months
after the accident could not give an opinion as to the extent of the in-
jury, based on the patient's statements about her then state of feeling.46
The Minnesota Supreme Court indicated a like disposition in Cam-
eron v. Evans,47 when it stated:
... Courts must exercise much circumspection in sustaining large
verdicts where there as no objective findings and the only evi-
dence of the extent of the injury is the word of the person in-
jured. Thus, in Lowe v. Armour Packing Co., supra [148 Minn.
464, 182 N.W. 610], it was held that, where objective symptoms
41App. Div. 631, 43 N.Y.S. 1156 (1897).
42Horowitz v. Hamburg American Packet Co., 18 Misc. 24, 41 N.Y.S. 54, 60
(1896).
43205 Iowa 365, 218 N.W. 31 (1928). Similarly, Harmon v. Industrial Comm'n.,
76 Ariz. 40, 258 P.2d 427 (1953).
44See 32 C.J.S. Evidence §546(94) (1964) ; 20 Amr. juR. Evidence §866 (1939);
Annot., 65 A.L.R. 1217 (1930); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 1051 (1957).
4217 Ill. 47, 75 N.E. 436 (1905). Cf. Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Burns, 118
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
46 Rowell v. Lowell, 11 Gray (Mass.) 420 (1958).
47 241 Minn. 200, 62 N.W.2d 793 (1954). And, see other cases cited in 2 AN.I.
JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs Back Injuries 315 (1959), and 25A C.J.S. Damages
§162 (9) (1966).
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indicate full recovery, a large verdict cannot be sustained be-
cause subjective symptoms described by the plaintiff indicate a
continuance of the ailment resulting from the injury unless the
evidence furnishes a basis for determining with reasonable cer-
tainty, the future consequences to be apprehended.
48
However, a Florida appellate court approved an attending physi-
cian's opinion that his patient's pain was permanent, assuming it had
not ceased by time of trial, although the opinion was based on the pa-
tient's self-serving statements regarding the pain.
49
None of the cases come to grips with the intrinsic problem under-
lying medical opinion founded on subjective complaints. That problem
involves the reliability or convincing power of an opinion which essen-
tially is no more than a medical blessing of veracity upon the words
of the claimant.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The test for the admission of opinion evidence of expert witnesses
has historically been whether the jury would be aided in a consideration
of the issues,5" and whether the witness has expertise in the area under
inquiry.51 When a doctor expresses his personal belief in the reality
of his patient's complaints, there being no organic manifestation of a
basis for them, he does not execute the function of an expert witness
-informing the jury of facts which, because of their lack of expertise,
they cannot understand.
There appears to be no evidentiary foundation for the admission
of opinions based exclusively on self-serving statements. Traditionally,
such statements were never accepted as substantive proof of the facts
related.
52
And, while medicine is an art and not a science, and while it has
been said "Doctors know what you tell them,"' 5 3 subjective symptoms
are an unreliable vehicle for evaluating disability. Where there is no
loss of function and no sign of injury, what justification is there for
permitting anyone, doctor or otherwise, to express a personal belief
in the propensity of the plaintiff for telling the truth? It is interesting
to consider what Dr. McBride says about the formula for medically
rating a permanent physical impairment:
The medical rating of disability should follow basic medical
diagnostic principles. It is just as important to adhere to regular
diagnostic and prognostic methods in evaluating permanent
48 62 N.W.2d, supra note 47 at 796.
49 Tampa Transit Lines, Inc. v. Smith, 155 So.2d 557 (Fla. App. 1963).
50 E.g., Kreyer v. Farmers' Co-op Lumber Co., 18 Wis.2d 67, 75, 117 N.W.2d
646, 650 (1962).
51 20 AM. JUR. Evidence §775 (1939).
52 See Ahlers, The Subjective Complaint and the Medical Examination, 25 INS.
COUNSEL J. 83 (1958), reprinted in 1958 PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR 241.
5 3 FLESCH, THE BOOK OF UNUSUAL QUOTATIONS 64 (1957). The statement is
attributed to Don Herold.
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physical impairment as it is to use such thoroughness in the diag-
nosis or prognosis of systemic disease. The procedure is to
elicit all evidence and suspicion of pathologic changes in the
anatomy or physiology of the body. All clinical symptoms and
signs of disabling physical impairment must be analyzed for
evaluation. The loss of inherent function of the injured part of
the body is the final step. (Emphasis added.) 54
Where there is no evidence of any change in anatomy or physiology,
and no sign of disabling physical impairment, there is no legal reason
to permit those Wisconsin physicians and surgeons, so bent, from con-
tinuing to find permanent disability because they believe they have a
sincere patient. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has lately observed
that:
. . . Many elements that go to a determination of impairment
capacity cannot be proven with certainty. Proof of these elements
must be permitted by facts or inferences that lead to reasonable
probabilities. Some (but not all) of the elements which cannot
always be shown with certainty are the length of time a dis-
ability will exist, the degree of improvement or additional dis-
ability that will ensue, the aptitude and ability of a disabled
person to engage in other types of work, and the compensation
he will be able to obtain .... 55
While the supreme court permits latitude in the proof of impaired
earning capacity, it should not exercise the same broad tolerance in
admitting testimony about the underlying disability where no concrete
evidence substantiates it. When the court is next accorded an oppor-
tunity to reconcile the Diernel and Rivera cases with the Lucas case,
it is hoped it will adhere to the "competent objective medical findings"
requirement of the latter case. To do otherwise will only cast the matter
of Wisconsin medical evidence into further uncertainty, simultaneously
promoting conjecture at the expense of the defense.
54 McBride, Disability Evaltation, The Portage Ticket to Rehabilitation, ARCH-
IVES OF PHYSICAL MEDICINE AND REHABILITATION (Jan. 1965), reprinted in 7
SCHWEITZER, CYCLOPEDIA OF TRIAL PRACTICE 50 (1966 Supp.).
55 Reinke v. Woltien, 32 Wis.2d 653, 661, 146 N.W.2d 493, 497 (1966).
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